Abstract. Public announcements are used in dynamic epistemic logic to model certain kinds of information change. A formula ψ ϕ represents the statement that after ψ is publicly announced ϕ will be the case.
Introduction
In epistemic logic we can reason about basic facts (represented by propositional variables) and about knowledge of different agents (represented by one operator K a per agent). A commonly used example in epistemic logic is that of a simple card game. Suppose two agents a and b are playing a game where they each hold one card, and they know their own card but not the other's card. Then if a holds a queen (and we use the propositional variable q to represent this basic fact) the formulas (i) K a q, (ii) q ∧ ¬K b q and (iii) K a ¬K b q represent the (true) statements that (i) a knows that she holds a queen, (ii) a holds a queen but b does not know this, and (iii) a knows that b does not know that she holds a queen.
In such a basic epistemic logic we cannot however express information change. For example, we cannot reason about what would happen if a were to show her card to b in basic epistemic logic. If we want to reason about information change we need to use a dynamic epistemic logic. There are many different kinds of dynamic epistemic logic, see for example [1] for an overview. One of the most common ways to turn a (static) epistemic logic into a dynamic epistemic logic is to add public announcements [2, 3] to the logic. A public announcement is a binary operator of the form ψ ϕ. The formula ψ ϕ is true if ϕ will hold after ψ is announced truthfully and publicly.
Using public announcements we can reason about what would happen if a were to show her card to b; the showing of a card can be considered an announcement of the card that a holds. The statement that after a shows her card b knows what card a holds is therefore represented by the (true) formula q K b q. One thing to note about the formula q K b q is that after q is announced agent b knows that q, so the announcing of q is a way for b to get to know q.
However, not all formulas can be learned in such a way. Consider the formula q ∧ ¬K b q, representing a holding a queen and b not knowing this. This formula was introduced in [4] as a formula that can never be known by b even if it is true. Since q ∧ ¬K b q can never be known by b there is also no announcement such that b will know q ∧ ¬K b q after the announcement. So not only is it impossible for b to get to know the truth of q ∧ ¬K b q by announcing q ∧ ¬K b q, there is no formula ψ such that ψ K b (q ∧ ¬K b q).
This last property, whether for a given ϕ there exists a ψ such that ψ K b ϕ requires us to quantify over all formulas. We can of course do this quantification meta-logically, but epistemic logic with public announcements does not allow us to perform this quantification inside the logic. This is unfortunate, as this means we cannot use public announcements to reason about whether it is possible to get to know something. A solution proposed in [5, 6] is to add one more operator ♦, representing arbitrary public announcements.
Such arbitrary public announcements can be useful when considering problems of knowability, but also in more practical scenarios such as in cryptography where it is important to know whether it is possible to make a public statement such that agent b learns the content p of a message but another agent e does not, so whether
We would like to define ♦ in such a way that ♦ϕ holds if and only if there is an announcement ψ such that ψ ϕ holds. There is a technical problem with this kind of definition, however. If we allow the announcement ψ to be any formula the evaluation of ♦ϕ would become circular. After all, in order to know whether ♦ϕ holds we would have to check whether ♦ϕ ϕ holds. But in order to know whether ♦ϕ ϕ holds we would among other things have to know whether ♦ϕ is a truthful announcement, so whether ♦ϕ holds.
This circularity is removed in [5, 6] by restricting ψ to formulas that do not themselves contain ♦ operators. So ♦ϕ holds if and only if there is a ♦-free formula ψ such that ψ ϕ. Unfortunately this means that the announcements in an arbitrary announcement operator are not in fact entirely arbitrary. But while the definition of ♦ cannot allow completely arbitrary announcements it might be possible to get entirely arbitrary announcements as an "emergent property". Suppose that whenever there is a ψ containing ♦ such that ψ ϕ there would always also be a ψ that is ♦-free such that ψ ϕ. Then ψ ϕ would imply ♦ϕ, even if ψ happens to contain a ♦.
A different way of phrasing this is to ask whether ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid for every ψ. It was shown in [5] that the implication is valid if there is only a single agent. In this paper I show that if there are multiple agents the validity of the implication depends on the class of models we use to evaluate the logic on and on ϕ. If we use only finite models then ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid. If we allow finitely branching infinite models then ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid for every ψ and every ♦-free ϕ. But if we allow models that are infinitely branching or if we do not restrict to ♦-free ϕ then there are ϕ and ψ such that ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is not valid.
In Section 2 I give some definitions needed to formulate and prove the results. Then in Section 3 I show that for finite models ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid. In Section 4.1 I prove that for finitely branching models ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid if ϕ is ♦-free. In Section 4.2 I construct ψ and ♦-free ϕ such that ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is not valid on infinitely branching models. Finally, in Section 4.3 I construct ϕ and ψ containing ♦ such that ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is not valid on finitely branching models.
Definitions
Let us start by defining arbitrary public announcement logic L APAL and the ♦-free fragment public announcement logic L PAL of L APAL . Let us fix a countably infinite set P of propositional variables and a finite set A of agents. The language of L APAL is then defined as follows.
Definition 1.
The formulas of L APAL are given by
where p ranges over P and a ranges over A. The intended reading of the non-boolean operators is as follows:
Definition 2. The logic
-K a ϕ is read as "agent a knows that ϕ", -ψ ϕ is read as "after it is publicly announced that ψ is the case ϕ holds", -♦ϕ is read as "there is a ♦-free announcement ψ such that ψ ϕ holds".
Since L APAL and L PAL are epistemic logics they are usually considered over the class of S5 models. We will follow this tradition, but it should be noted that none of the proofs in this paper depend on the special properties of S5 models. So all the results presented here also hold over the class of K models. The semantics for most operators of L APAL are as usual. For the only unusual operator ♦ it should be noted that it quantifies not over the formulas of L APAL but over the formulas of L PAL . 
Definition 4. Given a model
M = (W, R, v), a world w of M and ϕ, ψ formulas of L APAL the satisfaction relation |= is given by M, w |= p ⇔ w ∈ v(p) M, w |= ¬ϕ ⇔ M, w |= ϕ M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ M, w |= K a ϕ ⇔ M, w |= ϕ for all w ∈ W such that (w, w ) ∈ R(a) M, w |= ϕ ψ ⇔ M, w |= ϕ and M ϕ , w |= ψ M, w |= ♦ϕ ⇔ there is a L PAL formula ψ such that M, w |= ψ ϕ with M ϕ = (W ϕ , R ϕ , v ϕ ) where W ϕ = {w ∈ W | M,
APAL on Finite Models
With the definitions out of the way I can show that |= fin ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ for all L APAL formulas ψ. This is not a very surprising result; in a finite model we can replace any ♦ operator by the announcement of a disjunction of L PAL formulas, one for each world where the ♦ is replaced by the "chosen announcement" for that world.
Lemma 1. Fix a finite model
Proof. By induction on the construction of ϕ. The lemma trivially holds if ϕ is atomic. Suppose then as induction hypothesis that ϕ is not atomic, and that the lemma holds for all finite models and all subformulas of ϕ.
The formula ϕ is not atomic, so it is of one of the following forms:
By the induction hypothesis there is a L PAL formula ψ such that M |= ϕ ↔ ψ and, if applicable, a L PAL formula ψ such that M |= ϕ ↔ ψ . So if we take ψ to be ¬ψ , ψ ∨ ψ or K a ψ then we have M |= ϕ ↔ ψ in the first, second or third case respectively. Let us then consider fourth case. By the induction hypothesis there are
Let us then consider the fifth case, ϕ = ♦ϕ . Let W be the extension of ϕ,
This is a L PAL formula, since all its subformulas are L PAL formulas and W is a finite set. Furthermore, for each w i ∈ W we have M, w i |= ψ.
Suppose now towards a contradiction that for some w ∈ W \ W we have M, w |= ψ. Then one of the disjuncts of ψ holds in w , so for some
This shows that M |= ϕ ↔ ψ, which completes the induction step and thereby the proof.
It now follows immediately that |= fin ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ.
Theorem 1. For every L APAL formulas ϕ and χ we have
Proof. Fix any L APAL formulas ϕ and χ, and any finite model M.
Since this is true for any finite model M this implies that |= fin ϕ χ → ♦χ.
APAL on Infinite Models
On infinite models we cannot use the method that worked for finite models, wi∈W ϕ i ψ i is in general not a formula on infinite models since W may be infinite. Here I show that no other method can work; there are infinite models M, worlds w of M and L APAL formulas ϕ and ψ such that M, w |= ψ ϕ∧¬♦ϕ.
Like the result for the finite case this should not surprise us. What is somewhat surprising however is that the result extends to finitely branching models; there are ϕ and ψ such that |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. To see why it is unexpected that |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ consider the following. Fix any finitely branching model M and any world w of M. We cannot guarantee the existence of a L PAL formula ψ such that M |= ψ ↔ ψ , but since M is finitely branching we can for any n ∈ N guarantee the existence of a L PAL formula ψ such that M, w |= ψ ↔ ψ for every world w that is reachable within n steps from w.
The language of L APAL does not contain common knowledge, so it would at first glance seem like such a ψ that is equivalent to ψ up to a given distance might be sufficient to make ϕ have the same value after both announcements. If ϕ does not contain any ♦ operators then this does indeed work, for any L APAL formula ψ and any L PAL formula ϕ we have |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. But a ♦ operator (or more precisely: a operator) can make a formula depend on worlds that are arbitrarily far away in such a way that in certain models no finite approximation ψ of ψ will suffice.
I first show that for ♦-free ϕ we have |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ, then that there are ψ and ♦-free ϕ such that |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ and finally that for some ϕ that do contain ♦ we have |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. This order of proofs is chosen for reasons of clarity of exposition; the proof that |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ uses more complicated variants on some of the same techniques that are used in the proof of |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. Proof. If there is a L PAL formula ψ that distinguishes between two worlds then there is also a L APAL formula ψ that distinguishes between the two worlds, namely ψ = ψ . Left to show is that if L APAL can distinguish between two worlds then so can L PAL .
Validity of
The formulas of L APAL are invariant under bisimulation (see [6] ), so if a L APAL formula distinguishes between M, w 1 and M, w 2 then M, w 1 and M, w 2 are not bisimilar. On finitely branching models worlds are bisimilar if and only if they are indistinguishable by basic modal logic (see for example [1] ). So since M, w 1 and M, w 2 are not bisimilar they can be distinguished by a L PAL formula.
Lemma 2 also holds for models that are not finitely branching, but that requires a more complicated proof and we only need the result for finitely branching models. Proof. Fix any finitely branching model M and any world w of M. It was shown in [2] that every L PAL formula is equivalent to a L PAL formula that does not contain any public announcements. Let ϕ be the announcement-free formula equivalent to ϕ, and let n be the maximum nesting depth of K operators in ϕ . Then the truth of ϕ -and therefore also ϕ-on M, w does not depend on changes to worlds that are not reachable from w in at most n steps.
Let W be the set of worlds that are reachable from w in at most n steps, and let W 1 := {w ∈ W | M, w |= ψ} and W 2 := W \ W 1 . Then for each w i ∈ W 1 and w j ∈ W 2 the formula ψ distinguishes M, w i from M, w j , so by Lemma 2 there is also a L PAL formula that distinguishes the two worlds. Let As such, the models M ψ and M ψ only differ in worlds that are not reachable from w within n steps, so M, w |= ψ ϕ ↔ ψ ϕ. Because ψ is a L PAL formula this implies that M, w |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. The model M and world w were chosen as any finitely branching model and any world of that model, so we have |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ.
Invalidity of ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ on Infinitely Branching Models
If we do not restrict ourselves to finite or finitely branching models there are ϕ and ψ such that ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ is not valid. Let
Furthermore, let M be the model shown in Figure 1 and let M n for n ∈ N be the submodels indicated in Figure 1 .
We want to show that M, w |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. This requires us to show that M, w |= ψ ϕ and that M, w |= ♦ϕ. In order to prove that M, w |= ♦ϕ we have to demonstrate that if M, w |= ψ ϕ then ψ contains a ♦ operator. The subformula ϕ 1 is constructed in such a way that if M, w |= ψ ϕ then the update ψ retains an infinite number of worlds. The subformula ϕ 2 guarantees that if M, w |= ψ ϕ and ψ retains an infinite number of worlds then ψ must perform an infinite number of different updates, which cannot be done without a ♦ operator. But before looking at the details of the proof that M, w |= ♦ϕ let us start by proving the simpler part of the statement, namely that M, w |= ψ ϕ.
Lemma 4. We have M, w |= ψ ϕ.
Proof. To show is that M ψ |= ϕ, so let us look at which worlds are retained by ψ . The disjuncts p and q of ψ guarantee that any world in the leftmost three columns is retained.
The worlds in the fourth column from the left satisfy neither p nor q though, so they are retained only if they satisfy 
. Now consider one of the p worlds in the top two rows of M n . These two worlds can be distinguished from each other because their "tails" are of different lengths. This allows us to create an update χ n that removes the ¬p world adjacent to the top p world but not the one adjacent to the second row p world. The formula χ n := ¬p →K n−1 {a,b} K n {a,b} ¬p for example does this. The specific formula χ n that works for a submodel M n depends on n, but in every case it is a PAL formula so for every n the top two p worlds of M n satisfy
This means that the worlds in the fourth column are retained by ψ if and only if they are in the third row of any submodel M n . The model M ψ is therefore as shown in Figure 2 . It is straightforward to verify that w satisfies ϕ in that model. Now to show that there is no PAL formula ψ that satisfies M, w |= ψ ϕ. Recall that the two parts of ϕ have different purposes. The part ϕ 1 guarantees that ψ retains an infinite number of worlds while ϕ 2 guarantees that ψ performs an infinite number of different updates, which cannot be done without using a ♦ operator.
Lemma 5. For every L PAL formula ψ we have M, w |= ψ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is a L PAL formula ψ such that M, w |= ψ ϕ. Then we have M, w |= ψ ϕ 1 and M, w |= ψ ϕ 2 .
Consider M, w |= ψ ϕ 1 . The conjunctK c p guarantees that ψ retains at least one of the p worlds that are accessible from w, so at least one of the worlds in the second column.
The worlds in the second column alternate between r and ¬r, and the arrows between those worlds alternate between d and e. As a result the conjunct K c (r → K d ¬r) implies that if ψ retains an r world in the second column then it also retains the ¬r world below it. Likewise, the conjunct K c ((p∧¬r) →K e r) implies that if ψ retains a ¬r world in the second column then it also retains the r world below it.
So the three conjuncts of ϕ 1 together imply that ψ retains at least one of the worlds in the second column as well as all worlds below it.
Consider then M, w |= ψ ϕ 2 . The formula ϕ 2 says something about all creachable worlds that do not satisfy q, so all worlds in the second column (that are retained by ψ ). Of these worlds it says that they can reach two worlds by using f , one world satisfying ¬K c q ∧ K a p and one satisfying ¬K a p.
The worlds in the first two columns all satisfyK c q and K a p so these two f -reachable worlds must be in the third column. If the n-th world of the second column is retained by ψ there must therefore be two p worlds retained in M n . Furthermore, one of those worlds in M n must be adjacent to a ¬p world that is retained while the other must not be adjacent to a retained ¬p world.
One of the ¬p worlds in the second column of M n (so the fourth column of M) must be retained and one must not be retained, so in particular ψ must distinguish between two of those worlds. But the only way to distinguish between those worlds is to use the fact that one "tail" is shorter than the others, and doing this requires a formula with K-depth at least 2n − 2.
The K-depth of ψ is fixed and finite, so there is some N ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N the formula ψ cannot distinguish between the worlds in the second column of M n . Putting all of the above together, we get that ψ :
-must retain all worlds in the second column below a certain point, -must distinguish between two worlds in the second column of M n if the n-th world of the second column is retained and -cannot distinguish between the worlds in the second column of M n for all n greater than some number N . This is a contradiction, so our initial assumption that such a ψ exists must be false, which proves the lemma.
The theorem now follows easily.
Proof. Let M, w, ϕ and ψ be as defined above. Then M, w |= ψ ϕ by Lemma 4. Furthermore, by Lemma 5 we know that M, w |= ψ ϕ for every L PAL formula ψ so we have M, w |= ♦ϕ. This implies that M, w |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ and so that |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ.
Invalidity of ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ on Finitely Branching Models
Now to show that |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. The method used to show this is very similar to the method used to show that |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. We use ϕ to force ψ to retain an infinite number of worlds in a pointed model (N , w). Additionally we force ψ to distinguish between infinitely many pairs of worlds, and we let the difference between the two worlds in a pair get further and further away. Unfortunately, forcing ψ to retain an infinite number of worlds is much more complicated in a finitely branching frame, so we need more complex formulas and models. Let N be the model shown in Figure 3 and let
Note the recurring a-triangles with two p worlds in the model and the recurring subformulaK a K b p ∧K a (p ∧ ¬K b p). These subformulas have the property that they hold in the ¬p world of such a triangle if and only if for one of the p worlds in the triangle a b-reachable ¬p world is retained but for the other it is not. K b p ∧K a (p ∧ ¬K b p) ), and the right one does not. After the update ψ the formulaK a K b p∧K a (p∧¬K b p) therefore holds in the origin world of each submodel N x n . Since q and r only hold in the origin worlds of these submodels the update
Finally consider the third update ϕ 2 . It places conditions on q ∨ r worlds; q worlds must satisfy ¬K cKaKbKc r and r worlds must satisfy ¬K cKaKbKc q. After the other updates there are no q or r worlds that satisfy this condition.
As such the result of applying the three updates ψ ϕ 1 ϕ 2 removes the origin worlds of all N x n submodels. In the resulting model the two p worlds that are a-reachable form w are indistinguishable, so N ,
Together with the previous result N , w |= ψ ϕ 1 (K aKbKc q ∧ K aKbKc r) this shows that N , w |= ψ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is a L PAL formula ψ such that N , w |= ψ ϕ. Then after the updates ψ ϕ 1 the formulaK aKbKc q ∧ K aKbKc r must hold in w. The origin worlds of N q 1 and N r 1 and the paths to those worlds must therefore be retained by ψ ϕ 1 .
But after those two updates it must also hold in w that . This implies that for each n ∈ N and x ∈ {q, r} the update ψ must retain one of the worlds on the third row of the submodel but not the other. However, in N x n these worlds are indistinguishable up to depth 2n, so a L PAL formula must contain at least 2n + 1 iterations of a K-operator to distinguish them. There is therefore no single formula in L PAL that distinguishes the two worlds for every submodel. This contradicts the assumption that such a ψ exists.
The theorem now follows easily. Proof. For the L APAL formulas ϕ, ψ, finitely branching model N and world w of N as defined above we have N , w |= ψ ϕ by Lemma 6 and N , w |= ψ ϕ for every L PAL formula ψ by Lemma 7. This implies that N , w |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ so |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ.
Conclusion and Further Research
I showed that for any L APAL formula ϕ and ψ we have |= fin ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ and that for any L PAL formula ϕ and any L APAL formula ψ we also have |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ. Additionally, I showed that there are L APAL formulas ϕ and ψ such that |= br ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ and that there are a L PAL formula ϕ and a L APAL formula ψ such that |= ψ ϕ → ♦ϕ.
The operator ♦ therefore only represents a truly arbitrary public announcement on finite models. There are scenarios that can be modeled in finite models and where arbitrary public announcements are useful, such as the cryptography example mentioned in the introduction. The message p for which we want to know whether ♦(K b p ∧ ¬K e p) is generally taken from a finite set of possible messages which allows for a finite model to be used.
However, not all interesting scenarios allow for finite modeling, so it seems like an interesting topic for further research whether semantics for a different arbitrary public announcement operator can be found such that for any L PAL+ formulas ϕ, ψ we have |= ψ ϕ → ϕ. One possibility that might work is an infinite hierarchy of ♦ i operators, where each ♦ i quantifies over all formulas that use only ♦ j with j < i. I conjecture that if we then define ϕ as i∈N ♦ i ϕ we have |= ψ ϕ → ϕ.
